Charting_2024
through_Data
Analyzing key trends and patterns through data is fundamental for driving change in the policy realm. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has turned to its experts to get insights on some of the most important issues shaping the world in 2024. Backed by data, this report presents a range of policy issues that will be critical for charting a strong course for this year.
In 2023, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) routinely deployed forces near Taiwan to demonstrate its capabilities, intimidate the people of Taiwan, and signal Beijing’s resolve to the United States and its allies.
Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense reported over 1,700 PLA aircraft flying into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ) in 2023, which is on par with the year before.
Of those, over 700 crossed the Taiwan Strait median line—a significant uptick from the previous year. Median line crossings are an intentional effort to delegitimize the line’s significance and to demonstrate the PLA’s willingness to operate closer to Taiwan than in the past.
China has engaged in provocative behavior on a near daily basis since then and is employing new tactics like encircling Taiwan with drones and flying high-altitude balloons over the island.
In 2024, China will continue to use the PLA as a tool of coercion against Taiwan. On January 13, Taiwan elected Lai Ching-te of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) as its next president. Beijing strongly opposes Lai and the DPP and will likely ramp up pressure on Taiwan to isolate and punish his government.
More Readings:
1. The Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis
2. Surveying the Experts: U.S. and Taiwan Views on China's Approach to Taiwan
In 2023, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) routinely deployed forces near Taiwan to demonstrate its capabilities, intimidate the people of Taiwan, and signal Beijing’s resolve to the United States and its allies.
Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense reported over 1,700 PLA aircraft flying into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ) in 2023, which is on par with the year before.
Of those, over 700 crossed the Taiwan Strait median line—a significant uptick from the previous year. Median line crossings are an intentional effort to delegitimize the line’s significance and to demonstrate the PLA’s willingness to operate closer to Taiwan than in the past.
China has engaged in provocative behavior on a near daily basis since then, and is employing new tactics like encircling Taiwan with drones and flying high-altitude balloons over the island.
In 2024, China will continue to use the PLA as a tool of coercion against Taiwan. On January 13, Taiwan elected Lai Ching-te of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) as its next president. Beijing strongly opposes Lai and the DPP and will likely ramp up pressure on Taiwan to isolate and punish his government.
More Readings
1. The Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis
2. Surveying the Experts: U.S. and Taiwan Views on China's Approach to Taiwan
_02
Trends in Russia's Nuclear Threats
Heather Williams, Kelsey Hartigan, Lachlan MacKenzie, and Reja Younis – Project on Nuclear Issues
_02
Trends in Russia's Nuclear Threats
Heather Williams, Kelsey Hartigan, Lachlan MacKenzie, and Reja Younis – Project on Nuclear Issues
Russian nuclear weapons have been a constant shadow over the war in Ukraine. As Russian forces crossed the border on February 24, 2022, Putin threatened, “No matter who tries to stand in our way or all the more so create threats for our country and our people, they must know that Russia will respond immediately, and the consequences will be such as you have never seen in your entire history.”
Kremlin officials have since maintained a steady drumbeat of nuclear threats, although the focus of these threats shifted over time. Russia appears to have initially relied on nuclear threats to deter direct Western intervention in Ukraine, but increasingly used them to deter support for Ukraine as the war dragged on.
The Kremlin also attempted to manipulate nuclear risk when it faced battlefield setbacks in the fall of 2022. Although the intensity of Russia’s current rhetoric is greatly reduced from that of the early months of the war, the Kremlin will likely continue to use nuclear threats to influence Western behavior.
A collapse of the Russian army in Ukraine appears unlikely, and there is no reason to expect nuclear escalation in the near future. However, continuing to monitor and analyze Russian nuclear signaling will be critical for understanding and controlling the risks of nuclear use as the war continues.
More Readings
1. Deter and Divide: Russia's Nuclear Rhetoric & Escalation Risks in Ukraine
Russian nuclear weapons have been a constant shadow over the war in Ukraine. As Russian forces crossed the border on February 24, 2022, Putin threatened, “No matter who tries to stand in our way or all the more so create threats for our country and our people, they must know that Russia will respond immediately, and the consequences will be such as you have never seen in your entire history.”
Kremlin officials have since maintained a steady drumbeat of nuclear threats, although the focus of these threats shifted over time. Russia appears to have initially relied on nuclear threats to deter direct Western intervention in Ukraine, but increasingly used them to deter support for Ukraine as the war dragged on.
The Kremlin also attempted to manipulate nuclear risk when it faced battlefield setbacks in the fall of 2022. Although the intensity of Russia’s current rhetoric is greatly reduced from that of the early months of the war, the Kremlin will likely continue to use nuclear threats to influence Western behavior.
A collapse of the Russian army in Ukraine appears unlikely, and there is no reason to expect nuclear escalation in the near future. However, continuing to monitor and analyze Russian nuclear signaling will be critical for understanding and controlling the risks of nuclear use as the war continues.
More Readings
1. Deter and Divide: Russia's Nuclear Rhetoric & Escalation Risks in Ukraine
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Empowering European Defense Cooperation
Otto Svendsen and Sissy Martinez – Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program
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Empowering European Defense Cooperation
Otto Svendsen and Sissy Martinez – Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program
European defense is in a decrepit state. While European military spending saw its steepest year-to-year increase in at least 30 years and has risen by nearly a third since 2014, European countries are cooperating less in the defense realm. As a result, Europe’s military capabilities are less than the sum of its parts and remain far short of what is required for Europe to defend itself.
The fragmented spending landscape has also left Europe’s defense industrial base in a woeful state. The currently uncoordinated increases in European defense spending are thus unlikely to significantly reduce Europe’s reliance on the United States.
For decades, the standard demand from Washington has been for European countries to simply spend more on defense. In 2014, NATO leaders agreed to commit at least 2 percent of their GDP toward defense spending to help ensure the alliance's continued military readiness, but this figure has only been reached by a handful of European allies. With consensus building around the 2 percent mark as a floor rather than a ceiling and European countries accelerating their defense spending, the summit's priority should be to get the most out of these additional euros. The challenge now is about getting European defense industries to ramp up production, incentivizing joint procurement, and securing long-term aid to Ukraine. These endeavors require significant new funding and for Europeans to do something they rarely do in defense: coordinate and work together.
A new focus on strengthening European defense could benefit everyone: the United States can demonstrate leadership on burden sharing while Europe can benefit from political and practical support to strengthen its own security. In this regard, active and vocal support from the Biden administration will be crucial to getting staunchly transatlanticist and frugal European countries to agree to such a measure.
More Readings
1. Solving Europe’s Defense Dilemma: Overcoming the Challenges to European Defense Cooperation
2. Transforming European Defense: A New Focus on Integration
3. Why the Washington Summit Should Focus on Europe
4. Europe Needs a Paradigm Shift in How It Supports Ukraine
European defense is in a decrepit state. While European military spending saw its steepest year-to-year increase in at least 30 years and has risen by nearly a third since 2014, European countries are cooperating less in the defense realm. As a result, Europe’s military capabilities are less than the sum of its parts and remain far short of what is required to defend itself.
The fragmented spending landscape has also left Europe’s defense industrial base in a woeful state. The currently uncoordinated increases in European defense spending are thus unlikely to significantly reduce Europe’s reliance on the United States.
For decades, the standard demand from Washington has been for European countries to simply spend more on defense. In 2014, NATO leaders agreed to commit at least 2 percent of their GDP toward defense spending to help ensure the alliance's continued military readiness, but this figure has only been reached by a handful of European allies. With consensus building around the 2 percent mark as a floor rather than a ceiling and European countries accelerating their defense spending, the summit's priority should be to get the most out of these additional euros. The challenge now is about getting European defense industries to ramp up production, incentivizing joint procurement, and securing long-term aid to Ukraine. These endeavors require significant new funding and for Europeans to do something they rarely do in defense: coordinate and work together.
A new focus on strengthening European defense could benefit everyone: the United States can demonstrate leadership on burden sharing while Europe can benefit from political and practical support to strengthen its own security. In this regard, active and vocal support from the Biden administration will be crucial to getting staunchly transatlanticist and frugal European countries to agree to such a measure.
More Readings
1. Solving Europe’s Defense Dilemma: Overcoming the Challenges to European Defense Cooperation
2. Transforming European Defense: A New Focus on Integration
3. Why the Washington Summit Should Focus on Europe
4. Europe Needs a Paradigm Shift in How It Supports Ukraine
_04
Degradation of Groundwater Quality, Not Just Quantity, Poses an Increasingly Serious Threat
Zane Swanson, Anita Kirschenbaum, and
David Michel – Global Food and Water Security Program
_04
Degradation of Groundwater Quality, Not Just quantity, Poses an Increasingly Serious Threat
Zane Swanson, Anita Kirschenbaum, and
David Michel – Global Food and Water Security Program
Groundwater depletion in the United States is threatening human lives and livelihoods. As water quantity levels drop to dangerously low levels due to excessive pumping, the United States Geological Survey (USGS) reports another alarming trend—the increasing levels of detected contaminants in groundwater.
The most notable increases have been with secondary contaminants—those that do not pose the same level of risk to public health as primary contaminants, such as uranium and lead. However, secondary contaminants can still have significant negative impacts on health, infrastructure, and the environment.
Groundwater monitoring across the past two decades found that sodium concentrations significantly increased in more than 47 percent of the tested sites, while chloride concentrations increased in nearly 37 percent of aquifers.
While U.S. government agencies have not coalesced around enforceable safety thresholds for sodium and other secondary contaminants, these significant increases in contaminant levels are not a step in the right direction for public health and water security.
In decadal assessments spanning from 2002 to 2022, concentrations of several pollutants—including nitrate, sodium, chloride, sulfate—have also substantially increased in many aquifers across the United States.
Additionally, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has found no significant improvement in the number of public water system violations over the past decade, even reporting a slight increase in health-related violations in the past few years.
Taken together, these trends have significant implications for the water and food security of the United States, as domestic access to safe drinking water is already complicated by historical racial and socioeconomic disparities.
More Readings
1. Experts React: What Else Is Needed to Address Global Water Insecurity?
2. Water Stress in the U.S. with NYT's Chris Flavelle and CSIS's Caitlin Welsh
Groundwater depletion in the United States is threatening human lives and livelihoods. As water quantity levels drop to dangerously low levels due to excessive pumping, the United States Geological Survey (USGS) reports another alarming trend—the increasing levels of detected contaminants in groundwater.
The most notable increases have been with secondary contaminants- those that do not pose the same level of risk to public health as primary, such as uranium and lead. However, secondary maximum contaminants can still have signficant negative impacts on health, infrastructure, and the environment.
Groundwater monitoring across the past two decades found that sodium concentrations significantly increased in more than 47 percent of the tested sites, while chloride concentrations increased in nearly 37 percent of aquifers.
While US government agencies have not coalesced around enforceable safety thresholds for sodium and other secondary contaminants, these significant increases in contaminant levels are not a step in the right direction for public health and water security.
In decadal assessments spanning from 2002 to 2022, concentrations of several pollutants—including nitrate, sodium, chloride, sulfate—have also significantly increased in many aquifers across the United States.
Additionally, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has found no significant improvement in the number of public water system violations over the past decade, even reporting a slight increase in health-related violations in the past few years.
Taken together, these trends have significant implications for the water and food security of the United States, as domestic access to safe drinking water is already complicated by historical racial and socioeconomic disparities.
More Readings
1. Experts React: What Else Is Needed to Address Global Water Insecurity?
2. Water Stress in the U.S. with NYT's Chris Flavelle and CSIS's Caitlin Welsh
_05
Ecosystems under Siege: The Growing Challenge of Environmental Crime in Latin America and the Caribbean
_05
Ecosystems under Siege: The Growing Challenge of Environmental Crime in Latin America and the Caribbean
Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) is among the most critical regions in the world for the environment. Straddling three oceans, possessing vast mineral resources necessary for fueling the energy transition, and harboring critical ecosystems such as the Amazon Rainforest, which alone houses contains an estimated 10 percent of global biodiversity and vast mineral resources necessary for fueling the energy transition, LAC is an indispensable player in the fight against climate change.
However, the region's natural wealth has attracted a host of criminal players eager to exploit its bounty, placing this keystone region in a state of environmental siege. A range of criminal activities damage the environment, manifesting in forms as blatant as the strip-clearing of vast swathes of forest by illegal loggers, and as subtle as the small-scale, but highly profitable cultivation and smuggling of insects to foreign markets.
This challenge is further exacerbated by the existence of criminal regimes in the hemisphere like Venezuela and Nicaragua where governments work hand-in-glove with criminals to exploit the environment as a source of revenue. Such governments have incentives to obfuscate their activities, further hampering efforts to fully understand the scope of this challenge.
In all its forms, environmental crimes present three overarching threats: they destroy the natural environment upon which millions of lives and livelihoods depend, they erode citizen security in U.S. partner countries, and they generate illicit revenues which empower transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) throughout the hemisphere. However, compared to more traditional criminal enterprises, environmental crimes remain inadequately tracked and mapped. This in turn has rendered it difficult to marshal the political will needed to tackle deeply entrenched and ecologically devastating criminal practices.
Identifying, tracking, and mapping the range of environmental crimes is doubly important for the Western Hemisphere, where vast biodiversity combines with entrenched TCOs to form a dangerous concoction.
More Readings
1. Development Solutions to Address Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing in Latin America and the Caribbean
2. A Closer Look at Colombia’s Illegal, Artisanal, and Small-Scale Mining
3. Tracking Transatlantic Drug Flows: Cocaine's Path from South America across the Caribbean to Europe
Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) is among the most critical regions in the world for the environment. Straddling three oceans, possessing vast mineral resources necessary for fueling the energy transition, and with harboring critical ecosystems such as the Amazon Rainforest, which alone houses contains an estimated 10 percent of global biodiversity and vast mineral resources necessary for fueling the energy transition, LAC is an indispensable player in the fight against climate change.
However, the region's natural wealth has attracted a host of criminal players eager to exploit its bounty, placing this keystone region in a state of environmental siege. A range of criminal activities damage the environment, manifesting in forms as blatant as the strip-clearing of vast swathes of forest by illegal loggers, and as subtle as the small-scale, but highly profitable cultivation and smuggling of insects to foreign markets.
This challenge is further exacerbated by the existence of criminal regimes in the hemisphere like Venezuela and Nicaragua where governments work hand-in-glove with criminals to exploit the environment as a source of revenue. Such governments have incentives to obfuscate their activities, further hampering efforts to fully understand the scope of this challenge.
In all its forms, environmental crimes present three overarching threats: they destroy the natural environment upon which millions of lives and livelihoods depend, they erode citizen security in U.S. partner countries, and they generate illicit revenues which empower transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) throughout the hemisphere. However, compared to more traditional criminal enterprises, environmental crimes remain inadequately tracked and mapped. This in turn has rendered it difficult to marshal the political will needed to tackle deeply entrenched and ecologically devastating criminal practices.
Identifying, tracking, and mapping the range of environmental crimes is doubly important for the Western Hemisphere, where vast biodiversity combines with entrenched TCOs to form a dangerous concoction.
More Readings
1. Development Solutions to Address Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing in Latin America and the Caribbean
2. A Closer Look at Colombia’s Illegal, Artisanal, and Small-Scale Mining
3. Tracking Transatlantic Drug Flows: Cocaine's Path from South America across the Caribbean to Europe
As 2024 opens, advances in converging areas of technology—such as genome sequencing, CRISPR-Cas9 tools, and artificial intelligence—have made it cheaper and easier to fight disease, revolutionizing drug discovery and development, clinical care, and service delivery in remote areas.
Who has access to biological data and the discoveries it yields will be a critical driver of competitiveness in the next century, and resilience in the face of emerging outbreaks.
But biotechnology is racing ahead in the relative absence of regulation, risking both misuse, as bad actors could gain access to potentially dangerous biological materials and methods, and the perpetuation of deep inequities in access. Policymakers are balancing competing demands—to keep pace with industry, avoid stifling innovation, establish new industrial policy, and prioritize equity—all amid a contentious electoral cycle.
But there have been positive signals. An October 2023 White House executive order established several new biosecurity safeguards, and the administration is clarifying the rules for the riskiest infectious disease research. Globally, negotiations continue over a new pandemic agreement with a May 2024 target, and while divisions remain over sharing technology, data, and medical countermeasures, the process has managed to keep everyone at the table.
While 2024 may not be a make-or-break year, the rules set in the next 12 months will be an important benchmark for continuing negotiations over security and equity in this new age of bioinnovation.
More Readings
1. Eight Commonsense Actions on Biosafety and Biosecurity
2. High-Level Action Missing on Pandemic Preparedness
3. The Worst Is Over—Now What?
This year will be pivotal for many important issues. These include democracy and security in Taiwan and Ukraine; the strategic role the United States can play in Europe’s defense and cooperation; domestic water security and public health; the future of global biodiversity and mineral resources; and further advancement in biological and healthcare industry.
Experts at CSIS will continue to monitor and address these critical issues as they forge ahead and begin to navigate the intricate landscape of 2024.
Authors
1. Brian Hart, Fellow, China Power Project
2. Heather Williams, Director; Kelsey Hartigan, Deputy Director; Lachlan MacKenzie, Program Coordinator and Research Assistant; and Reja Younis, Associate Fellow – Project on Nuclear Issues
3. Otto Svendsen, Research Associate; and Sissy Martinez, Program Manager and Research Associate – Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program
4. Zane Swanson, Fellow; Anita Kirschenbaum, Program Manager; and David Michel, Senior Fellow – Global Food and Water Security Program
5. Henry Ziemer, Research Associate, Americas Program
6. Michaela Simoneau, Associate Fellow, Global Health Policy Center
iDeas Lab Story Production
Project conception & management: Jaehyun Han
Editorial & design: Sarah B. Grace
Data visualizations: Jaehyun Han , Sarah B. Grace & Fabio Murgia
Illustrations & support on development, design, & production: Gab K. De Jesus
Copyediting support: Katherine Stark & Rayna Salam