Copyright © CNES 2026, Distribution Airbus DS

Copyright © CNES 2026, Distribution Airbus DS

Copyright © 2026 by Vantor

Copyright © 2026 by Vantor

Copyright © 2026 by Vantor

Copyright © 2026 by Vantor

Copyright © 2026 by Vantor; Copyright © CNES 2026, Distribution Airbus DS (Ethiopia)

Copyright © 2026 by Vantor; Copyright © CNES 2026, Distribution Airbus DS (Ethiopia)

High in the Entoto Hills above Ethiopia’s capital city, a satellite dish as wide as a city bus has appeared beside a newly modernized space observation center.

On the outskirts of Cairo, a gleaming white radome rises above a next-generation satellite assembly and testing complex.

In Namibia’s rocky highlands, two isolated research stations boast massive new antennas used to track and communicate with satellites overhead.

These facilities—all built or expanded in just the last five years—share one defining feature.

They were built by China.

Beijing is rapidly stitching together a network of specialized outposts, positioning itself as a gateway to space for developing countries. Yet the deep integration of China’s space sector with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) means these partnerships carry risks—for host nations and for the United States.

In China's Orbit

Beijing’s Space Diplomacy in the Global South

By: Matthew P. Funaiole, Brian Hart, and Aidan Powers-Riggs 
January 15, 2026 

Across the world, countries are racing to tap into a fast-growing space economy that is transforming sectors as varied as defense, logistics, agriculture, and finance. Yet many Global South nations lack the resources and expertise to build a space program on their own.

As China’s capabilities have matured, it has positioned itself as the partner of choice for many of these countries. The Chinese space industry now offers a full stack of space services, including designing, manufacturing, and launching satellites, and constructing terrestrial infrastructure for satellite tracking and communications.

To capture the scale and diversity of China’s overseas space activities, CSIS developed the China Space Cooperation Index, which scores countries on a scale of 0–100 based on the intensity of their engagement across five domains.

Since 2000, China has engaged 64 countries on at least one of the five indicators. Three-quarters of those countries are part of the Global South, reflecting Beijing’s deliberate strategy to target emerging markets across Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

Topping the index are Pakistan, Egypt, and Venezuela—regional heavyweights where China has made inroads as a key security and development partner.

Africa has emerged as a particular focal point for China. Beijing has engaged with African nations across the full spectrum of space development, including satellite design and on-the-ground technical training.

This deepening involvement reflects a concerted effort by China to draw African countries into its orbit, providing Beijing with significant advantages.

  • Geographically, positioning physical infrastructure such as antennas and ground stations across the continent helps China to close critical coverage gaps in its global space tracking and data relay networks, allowing it to receive downlinked data faster.
  • Politically, investing in Africa’s high-tech industrial development helps Beijing to shape its image as a supportive and reliable partner for governments across the continent.
  • Economically, with limited competition from U.S. or European firms, Beijing has found an open pathway to expand into new and growing markets, laying the groundwork for its emerging commercial space sector to compete globally.

Several African countries stand out for the depth of their collaboration with China. Technical agreements and memorandums of understanding are important signals of cooperation, but building ground infrastructure reflects an even greater level of commitment.

Commercial satellite imagery of China’s expanding presence in Egypt, Ethiopia, and Namibia shows how Beijing is using space partnerships to reinforce its geopolitical foothold in the continent.

Egypt
Egypt

Egypt is China’s most comprehensive space partner in Africa and ranks second globally in the China Space Cooperation Index. Its collaboration with China accelerated in 2019, when Beijing agreed to fund and help construct the MisrSat-2 satellite along with critical ground infrastructure.

View the full satellite imagery here.

View the full satellite imagery here.

Led by the state-owned defense contractor China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation and Egypt’s Space Agency, the project created a full turnkey capability: a low-Earth-orbit optical satellite, a ground control and tracking station, and a new assembly, integration, and testing facility at the recently built Egypt Space City outside Cairo.  

When MisrSat-2 launched aboard a Chinese Long March-2C rocket in December 2023, Chinese state media hailed the satellite as a “model for cooperation with China.”  

What began as a single satellite project has since evolved into a broader platform for sustained engagement in Egypt’s space and defense ecosystem.

View the full satellite imagery here.

Chinese engineers continue to provide technical training and operational support at the facility. In 2023, the military-linked China Great Wall Industry Corporation (CGWIC) showcased its dual-use aerospace systems at the Egypt Defense Exhibitions, where it also held talks to “actively promote the development of [its] projects in the West Asia and North Africa region.”  

Egypt
Ethiopia

As with Egypt, China’s space partnership with Ethiopia took off in 2019, when a Chinese rocket launched ETRSS-1, the African country’s first satellite. Built for the Ethiopian Space Science and Geospatial Institute by the China Academy of Space Technology, the primary producer of military and government spacecraft in China, the satellite came packaged with training and full-service technical support.

The relationship quickly expanded from orbit to the ground. In 2021, Chinese firms helped construct a 7.3-meter receiving antenna at Ethiopia’s Entoto Observatory near Addis Ababa. China followed this up in 2024 with an even larger 12-meter antenna just outside of the main facility. Both systems can process high-resolution imagery and track multiple satellites.

View the full satellite imagery here.

Chinese and Ethiopian officials have hailed the site as a commercialized “ground station as a service” model, allowing Ethiopia to charge foreign clients for access. Staff there say that Ethiopian technicians independently manage satellite operations and sell the data collected. Details about China’s continued access are scarce, but Beijing’s central role in building and upgrading the facility suggests that it likely maintains an enduring presence.  

Egypt
Namibia

On the southern end of the African continent, China is quietly expanding its footprint in Namibia from a single site to two facilities stretching from the capital to the coast. Namibia lacks its own satellites in orbit, making it notable that the country hosts two relatively sophisticated ground stations.

Windhoek

On November 28, 2025, China officially handed over a new Satellite Ground Data Receiving Station and Processing System at Telecom Namibia’s Earth Station in Windhoek, built and financed by China under a bilateral technology sharing agreement. Similar to the Ethiopia site, the new station’s 7.8-meter satellite dish and communications tower was installed in a separate area from the main facility. 

As part of the agreement, Chinese engineers will train Namibian personnel to eventually operate and maintain the system independently. According to media reporting, the facility will be used to receive and process remote-sensing data for applications in environmental management, agriculture, and disaster response.  

View the full satellite imagery here.

View the full satellite imagery here.

Swakopmund

Farther west, at Swakopmund, satellite imagery shows the installation of a new antenna at an existing ground station near the coast. China first established the Swakopmund station in 2001 to support its manned spaceflight program. The site is managed by the Xi’an Satellite Control Center, otherwise known as Base 26, a facility operated under the Satellite Launch, Tracking, and Control Department of China’s PLA Aerospace Force.  

View the full satellite imagery here.

View the full satellite imagery here.

Swakopmund is a key node plugging into China’s wider network of telemetry, tracking and command (TT&C) facilities scattered across China, South Asia, and Latin America.  

Together, its expanding presence there as well as Windhoek will bring new links to a distributed ground segment system capable of receiving data from multiple satellites passing over southern Africa.

While Beijing’s engagements with the Global South support legitimate scientific and commercial ventures, its expanding presence there warrants close attention from Washington.

Many space technologies are inherently suited for dual-use roles. Commercial or civil satellites that enable internet connectivity and environmental monitoring can also support military communications, intelligence gathering, and targeting. Ground stations that downlink data can likewise be used to track foreign satellites and feed into broader space surveillance networks.  

Chinese authorities have spoken openly about the importance of reaping dual-use advantages of commercial space activities. In 2018, a Chinese Communist Party official called for China to “gradually establish a space information service system that connects military, civilian, and commercial sectors.”  

This vision aligns with China’s military-civil fusion (军民融合, MCF) strategy, President Xi Jinping’s signature effort to fuse together the nation’s economic development and national security strategies so that advances in one domain can be leveraged in the other.

"Many of China’s commercial companies are part of its military-civil fusion strategy to develop dual-use technologies in the commercial sector for eventual integration into the military."

– U.S. Department of Defense 2025 China Military Power Report

Tellingly, the key players in China’s overseas space projects are primarily state-owned defense firms with deep connections to the PLA. These companies and their subsidiaries build many of the satellites constructed for partner countries, as well as the rockets that launch them. They also build the antennas and other key components of the ground infrastructure used in commercial ventures overseas—and in defense programs at home.

Private Chinese firms are increasingly entering the picture as well. Emposat, a leading provider of commercial ground station services, is expanding overseas to meet growing global demand for TT&C.  

The company says it operates a network of stations in China and across South and Central Africa, South Asia, and the South Pacific. In 2021, it inked a deal with Azerbaijan to establish its first overseas fixed station, which included the construction of a 7.3-meter antenna.  

The following year, the station provided its first uplink services to a small remote sensing satellite built by the Beijing-based firm Smart Satellite. While it operates as a private company, Smart Satellite is working with the state-owned defense contractor China Electronics Technology Group to develop a constellation of synthetic aperture radar (SAR) satellites.  

Chinese space firms have a track record of engaging in activities that threaten U.S. security and interests. In 2023, the U.S. government sanctioned the Chinese small satellite producer Spacety for providing SAR imagery to the Russian paramilitary force Wagner Group, supporting its combat operations in Ukraine.  

More recently, the U.S. State Department confirmed reports that Chang Guang Satellite Technology, a leading Chinese remote sensing firm with over 200 satellites in orbit, sold imagery to the Houthis, the Iran-backed Yemeni militia responsible for dozens of attacks on U.S. and allied commercial and naval vessels in the Red Sea since 2023. 

A 2022 contract between Beijing Yunze Technology Co Ltd and the Wagner Group affiliate Nika-Frut for the acquisition of two high resolution CGST remote sensing satellites.

A 2022 contract between Beijing Yunze Technology Co Ltd and the Wagner Group affiliate Nika-Frut for the acquisition of two high resolution CGST remote sensing satellites.

Similar security concerns could emerge as China’s dual-use space sector grows more capable and becomes increasingly available to countries and nonstate actors worldwide. Concerningly, the emergence of its private space industry enables Beijing to support intelligence or combat operations against U.S. and allied forces while maintaining a degree of deniability.

China’s space diplomacy should also raise questions about the United States’ future economic competitiveness in a critical emerging industry.

Global investment in the space economy reached a record $613 billion in 2024, nearly doubling from $330 billion just a decade earlier. By 2035, the sector is projected to reach an eye-popping $1.8 trillion in value. 

For now, U.S.-based firms still have a major edge. The United Stated dominates in launch services, for example, thanks to the transformative advances in reusable rocket technologies pioneered by SpaceX, which has slashed the cost of launching payloads into orbit.

However, U.S. leadership is at risk of eroding. While China’s commercial space sector is still nascent, it boasts a growing number of technologically sophisticated companies that are beginning to close the gap with U.S. firms on cost and quality. Meanwhile, China’s government is putting the full weight of its immense state capacity behind an effort to cultivate a world-leading industry capable of challenging U.S. dominance. 

More importantly, China is deliberately targeting developing countries for partnerships while the United States has tended to focus on partnerships with developed economies. Between 2005 and 2024, China secured roughly $871.5 million in satellite contracts across Africa, more than triple the $250 million won by U.S. firms.  

Since 2010, China has launched 65 satellites for foreign customers, 70 percent of them for developing countries. While U.S. rockets have launched a far greater number of foreign-owned satellites by value, only 15 percent of them belong to Global South countries.

China’s approach to international space cooperation echoes its global rollout of 5G telecom. Chinese state-backed champions such as Huawei and ZTE were able to step in with low-cost, turnkey infrastructure for developing countries that lacked affordable Western alternatives, allowing China to dominate in emerging markets and eventually become the world’s largest 5G provider.

This not only cost U.S. and allied firms valuable market opportunities but also left many countries with long-term strategic dependencies on Beijing.

China is now applying a similar playbook to space, offering satellites, launch services, ground stations, and technical training as an integrated package to nations across the Global South.

To avoid repeating the 5G experience, Washington needs to rethink its approach to global space cooperation. The United States has largely focused on wealthy partners, but expanding engagement with the Global South would better serve long-term strategic interests.

Focusing on four priorities can help the United States reestablish its influence, counter China’s growing presence, and cultivate new markets for the U.S. space industry:

  • Rebuild sustained space engagement in the Global South by restoring and modernizing programs like SERVIR that integrate NASA’s technical capabilities into U.S. international development programs. The Trump administration’s newly launched U.S.-Africa Technical and Regulatory Space Training Meeting represents a strong first step, but deepened commercial engagement from industry players will be needed to better compete with China’s emerging market-oriented approach. 
  • Establish a dedicated U.S. financing mechanism for space projects in the Global South, using vehicles such as concessional loans and blended finance to help countries purchase U.S. and allied space services.
  • Reserve a small share of U.S. commercial launch capacity for Global South partners and offer discounted rideshare slots on U.S. rockets to help them reduce their reliance on Chinese launch services.
  • Modernize U.S. export control policy to allow greater overseas commercial engagement by U.S. space firms. Leading space services companies in the United States have cited restrictive rules under the State Department’s International Traffic in Arms Regulations as barriers to competing in growing overseas markets. 

To learn more, read the index methodology, download the data, and view the full satellite imagery.

This report was made possible by general support to CSIS. No direct sponsorship contributed to this report.

This report was produced by the Andreas C. Dracopoulos iDeas Lab.

Written by: Matthew P. Funaiole, Brian Hart, and Aidan Powers-Riggs

Satellite Imagery analysis by: Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. and Jennifer Jun

Data analysis support by: Jaehyun Han

Special thanks to Kari Bingen, Oge Onubogu, Temidayo Oniosun, and Brenda Chou.

Satellite Imagery: Copyright © 2026 by Vantor; Copyright © CNES 2026, Distribution Airbus DS (Ethiopia)

Production and Data Design by: Michael Kohler

Development by: Mariel de la Garza and José Romero

Design support by: William Taylor and Sabina Hung

Copyediting by: Hunter Macdonald

Photo & Video:
Document:
AFP via Getty Images
Rocket:
Liu Guoxing/VCG via Getty Images

Established in Washington, D.C. over 60 years ago, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) is a bipartisan, nonprofit policy research organization dedicated to advancing practical ideas that address the world’s greatest challenges.

Hidden Reach is a CSIS special initiative that shines light on under-appreciated sources of China's far-reaching influence abroad.