Extended Range

China Upgrades Its Military Base in Djibouti

By: Matthew Funaiole, Brian Hart, Aidan Powers-Riggs, Douglas Comstock
Published: September 17, 2026

China’s military has upgraded its base in Djibouti, enhancing its operational and intelligence-gathering capabilities in the Middle East and Africa. Commercial satellite imagery shows that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has installed new equipment that will strengthen its internal communications capabilities while also enabling signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection.

The PLA Support Base in Djibouti (中国人民解放军驻吉布提保障基地) is China’s only formally acknowledged overseas military base. It plays a crucial role in the larger ambitions of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to conduct “far seas” operations well beyond China’s shores.

Djibouti is strategically positioned along the Gulf of Aden and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, a 20-mile-wide vital chokepoint that carries an estimated 16 percent of global maritime trade. The country’s location has made it a hotspot for foreign military bases. The United States, France, Italy, and Japan each operate bases less than 10 miles from China’s. 

Since opening in 2017, the Djibouti base has supported PLAN Naval Escort Task Force operations in the Gulf of Aden, which have helped protect China’s overseas commercial interests from asymmetric threats while offering naval forces valuable operational experience.

The base’s capabilities have continued to evolve over time to enable increasingly sophisticated operations, helping the PLAN establish a growing foothold in the region.

Since mid-2024, two new communications facilities have emerged in the base’s southeastern and northwestern corners.

The larger southeastern facility features a main control building, three 30-meter dipole antennas for high-frequency (HF) communications, two smaller antennas for very/ultra-high frequency (V/UHF) communications, three mobile dish antennas for satellite communications (SATCOM), four probable 5G towers, and a radome enclosing an unidentified asset. 

Across the base, two crossed dipole HF antennas and a radome (similar to those in the southeastern facility) are present alongside a main control building. Additional reinforced cable trenches laid in 2025 suggest more antennas may be added in the future.

These two facilities very likely work as two halves of one base-wide command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) architecture, providing the PLA with a much more robust picture of the operating environment in the region.  

View summary PDF with detailed satellite imagery here.

The type and orientation of the base’s new equipment is varied, enabling transmission and detection across a wide range of signals and frequencies.

In practice, this new equipment allows the PLA to maintain redundant, over-the-horizon communications with Chinese ships and aircraft operating in the region and provides secure communications channels with command headquarters in China.

The facilities also likely enable the PLA to monitor the activities of other militaries operating nearby. Open-source methods cannot confirm whether passive SIGINT collection is underway, but these new assets would almost certainly support a SIGINT mission set. Although military communications are encrypted, the PLA could draw valuable insights into U.S. and other militaries’ operations by observing the direction, origin, frequency, and pace of their signals.

The PLA held the opening ceremony for its first overseas military support base in Djibouti on August 1, 2017, coinciding with the 90th anniversary of the founding of the PLA.

The PLA held the opening ceremony for its first overseas military support base in Djibouti on August 1, 2017, coinciding with the 90th anniversary of the founding of the PLA.

Recent conflicts across the Middle East have sharply increased the intelligence value of Chinese SIGINT capabilities in Djibouti. Since late 2023, Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping and the escalation of U.S. and Israeli operations against Iran have drawn substantial U.S. forces into the region. By July 2026, more than 20 U.S. Navy warships, including two carrier strike groups and hundreds of aircraft, were supporting operations against Iran and around the Strait of Hormuz.  

The new facilities could also help China glean valuable insights into activities in Africa, where Beijing has deep economic interests and growing security ties. In recent years, China has built ground-based space infrastructure in the region to close coverage gaps in its global space-tracking and data-relay networks. Improvements at the base in Djibouti add more nodes in China’s expanding global network of facilities that can feed information back into the nation’s intelligence community.  

Taken together, these upgrades at the Djibouti base give China a persistent forward C4ISR node covering much of the Middle East and Africa. That could prove valuable for China as it seeks a deeper understanding of the regional operational environment in order to project power farther from home.   

View summary PDF with detailed satellite imagery here.

This report was produced by the Andreas C. Dracopoulos iDeas Lab.

Written by Matthew P. Funaiole, Brian Hart, Aidan Powers-Riggs, and Douglas Comstock

Satellite Imagery Analysis support by: Joseph S. Bermudez Jr.

Production by: Michael Kohler

Design support by: William Taylor

Editorial support by: Kelsey Hartman and Phillip Meylan

Satellite Imagery: Copyright © 2026 by Planet
Photo & Video: Closing Image - STR/AFP via Getty Images

Established in Washington, D.C. over 60 years ago, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) is a bipartisan, nonprofit policy research organization dedicated to advancing practical ideas that address the world’s greatest challenges.

Hidden Reach is a CSIS special initiative that shines light on under-appreciated sources of China's far-reaching influence abroad.