DETER AND DIVIDE
Russia's Nuclear Rhetoric
& Escalation Risks in Ukraine
By: Heather Williams, Kelsey Hartigan, Lachlan MacKenzie & Reja Younis
CSIS Project on Nuclear Issues
As the war in Ukraine passed the year mark in March 2023, the United Nations warned that the risk of nuclear weapons use was the highest it had been since the darkest days of the Cold War. Five months earlier, in October 2022, U.S. president Joe Biden warned of "the prospect of Armageddon."
Russia’s nuclear threats have underpinned each stage of the conflict.
Assessing Russia’s nuclear threats, and the international responses to them, can shed light on future Russian signaling and its policy implications.
While Putin’s intentions cannot be definitively discerned, analyzing the Kremlin’s rhetoric is critical for assessing the likelihood of future nuclear use.
This analysis focuses on three critical questions:
—1—
To what end(s) has Russia used nuclear threats and what impact have they had?
—2—
Have Western efforts to prevent nuclear use been effective?
—3—
Would Putin consider using nuclear weapons if Russia were losing in Ukraine?
To answer these questions, the CSIS Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) compiled a data set of Russian nuclear activities, including nuclear threats, along with NATO and Western responses, during the first 18 months of the invasion.
The results of this analysis reveal three key phases of Russia’s nuclear posturing during the war, each with its own risks, trajectories, and lessons for the future.
Russia’s Nuclear Posture
Russia has the largest nuclear arsenal in the world.
As of May 2023, Russia had a nuclear stockpile of approximately 4,489 active nuclear warheads for use on a range of intercontinental ballistic missile, submarine, bomber, and other non-strategic delivery systems. Only 1,674 warheads, however, are currently deployed.
Russian nuclear doctrine lists four scenarios for the use of these weapons:
1) Receipt of reliable data about the launch of ballistic missiles against Russia or its allies
2) Use of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) against Russia or its allies
3) Attacks against Russian nuclear command, control, and communications infrastructure
4) Aggression against Russia with conventional weapons that threatens “the very existence” of the Russian state
Independent of its declaratory doctrine, the Kremlin could use nuclear weapons first in a conflict to control escalation and signal resolve.
Experts have long debated the ambiguities in Russian doctrine and the conditions under which Putin might use nuclear weapons.
Until February 2022, these debates were largely academic, but Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has elevated the urgency of these considerations. Of particular importance is the question of whether Putin draws a distinction between the Russian state and his own regime.
Given the risks that Putin has taken in his efforts to gain political control over Ukraine, it is possible that he believes that defeat would pose a threat to the “very existence” of his rule.
Russia’s Nuclear Posture
Russia has the largest nuclear arsenal in the world.
As of May 2023, Russia had a nuclear stockpile of approximately 4,489 active nuclear warheads for use on a range of intercontinental ballistic missile, submarine, bomber, and other non-strategic delivery systems. Only 1,674 warheads, however, are currently deployed.
Russian nuclear doctrine lists four scenarios for the use of these weapons:
1) Receipt of reliable data about the launch of ballistic missiles against Russia or its allies
2) Use of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) against Russia or its allies
3) Attacks against Russian nuclear command, control, and communications infrastructure
4) Aggression against Russia with conventional weapons that threatens “the very existence” of the Russian state
Independent of its declaratory doctrine, the Kremlin could use nuclear weapons first in a conflict to control escalation and signal resolve.
Experts have long debated the ambiguities in Russian doctrine and the conditions under which Putin might use nuclear weapons.
Until February 2022, these debates were largely academic, but Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has elevated the urgency of these considerations. Of particular importance is the question of whether Putin draws a distinction between the Russian state and his own regime.
Given the risks that Putin has taken in his efforts to gain political control over Ukraine, it is possible that he believes that defeat would pose a threat to the “very existence” of his rule.
The Precursor
2014 – 2022
Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine followed several unsuccessful efforts to exert political control over the country.
The current conflict traces its origins to the winter of 2013–2014. In December, Putin pressured Ukraine’s pro-Russian president, Viktor Yanukovych, to abandon the path to partnership with the European Union in favor of a deal with the Kremlin for $15 billion in aid and cheaper energy prices.
Protests against Yanukovych’s decision forced him to flee the country in February 2014. Putin responded by illegally seizing Crimea and providing military support to separatists in Donbas.
Between 2015 and 2022, the frontlines in Donbas were largely static, but Ukraine’s ties to the West grew stronger, as did the Ukrainian military. The Kremlin became increasingly strident in its opposition to Ukraine’s ties to NATO.
Alliance leaders responded that while they were open to diplomacy, they were unwilling to discuss shutting NATO’s doors to new members.
On February 24, 2022, following months of military buildup and in the wake of a large-scale nuclear exercise, Putin launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The invasion was intended to topple the Western-aligned government of Volodymyr Zelensky within 72 hours.
Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine followed several unsuccessful efforts to exert political control over the country.
The current conflict traces its origins to the winter of 2013–2014. In December, Putin pressured Ukraine’s pro-Russian president, Viktor Yanukovych, to abandon the path to partnership with the European Union in favor of a deal with the Kremlin for $15 billion in aid and cheaper energy prices.
Protests against Yanukovych’s decision forced him to flee the country in February 2014. Putin responded by illegally seizing Crimea and providing military support to separatists in Donbas.
Between 2015 and 2022, the frontlines in Donbas were largely static, but Ukraine’s ties to the West grew stronger, as did the Ukrainian military. The Kremlin became increasingly strident in its opposition to Ukraine’s ties to NATO.
In the lead-up to the February 2022 invasion, Russia made several demands of the United States and NATO:
Alliance leaders responded that while they were open to diplomacy, they were unwilling to discuss shutting NATO’s doors to new members.
On February 24, 2022, following months of military buildup and in the wake of a large-scale nuclear exercise, Putin launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The invasion was intended to topple the Western-aligned government of Volodymyr Zelensky within 72 hours.
Phase 1: