How China Could Blockade Taiwan

By Bonny Lin, Brian Hart, Matthew P. Funaiole,
Samantha Lu, and Truly Tinsley

Chinese leaders are determined to prevent Taiwan’s permanent separation and eventually bring it under their control. Beijing’s growing use of its military to put pressure on Taiwan in recent years has stoked concerns that it may invade the island. Yet China has options other than invasion, one of which is a blockade designed to break the will of Taiwan’s people to resist.

Why China Might Blockade Taiwan

Chinese military planners have long considered a blockade to be one of the main campaigns for which the PLA needs to prepare.

Science of Campaigns, a textbook published in 2006 by China’s National Defense University, defines a “joint blockade campaign” (联合封锁战役) as “an offensive campaign that is implemented by Navy-, Air Force-, Second Artillery- and Army campaign large formations with the assistive concerted efforts of the armed police force and militia . . . to sever enemy economic and military connections with the outside world.”

A blockade would aim to take advantage of Taiwan’s status as an island with limited natural resources. Taiwan is much more dependent on trade than other large economies. In 2022, Taiwan’s imports and exports amounted to 61 and 69 percent of its GDP, respectively. By comparison, China’s imports and exports were only 15 and 20 percent of its GDP.

Taiwan is particularly reliant on foreign energy supplies, importing about 97 percent of its energy. It also imports approximately 70 percent of its food, though it is self-sufficient in certain staples that could help sustain its population. 

Reportedly, Taiwan has less than two months of coal and natural gas reserves for electricity generation, six months of crude oil reserves, and six months of food stockpiles. In the most likely blockade scenarios, these stockpiles would be subject to Chinese bombardment, reducing Taiwan’s ability to resist. Making matters more challenging, a survey conducted by the CSIS China Power Project found that many experts believe China could sustain major military operations against Taiwan for at least six months.

China does not need to hermetically seal off Taiwan to achieve its goals. Curtailing trade into Taiwan by even 50 percent would prove detrimental for Taiwan, especially if Beijing stops all or most imports of oil, natural gas, and coal, which would eventually cause progressive failures in electric power distribution around the island.

However, a blockade would not be without its drawbacks for Beijing. There is no guarantee that a blockade alone will achieve Beijing’s goals. If Taiwan proves resilient, and if it receives assistance from the United States or others, China may find it impossible to force Taiwan’s capitulation without forcefully occupying the island.

In all, there are numerous factors at play that likely shape Chinese decisionmakers’ thinking about the advantages and disadvantages of a blockade:

This mixture of pluses and minuses shows that a blockade of Taiwan would be a serious gamble and would not guarantee China more success than an invasion. There is also the possibility that China would need to escalate a blockade into an invasion if Taiwan is not willing to capitulate or if the U.S. and other forces intervene.

Yet in the near term, a blockade could be more appealing for Beijing. In a 2023 CSIS China Power Project survey of experts from the United States and Taiwan, a highly kinetic joint blockade was seen as more likely than an invasion in the next five years—though only by a small margin. 

This likely reflects beliefs that China currently lacks the capability to successfully invade Taiwan, but this strategic calculus could shift as the PLA’s capabilities grow. 

How China Could Implement a Blockade

A blockade would be an unprecedented undertaking for China, requiring it to overcome complex operational and logistic hurdles. Chinese decisionmakers would have to not only command joint military operations but also coordinate law enforcement and maritime militia forces to support the PLA. They would also need to prepare for war with Taiwan and the possibility of war with the United States and its allies and partners.

Nevertheless, China is rapidly enhancing its capabilities, including the kinds of forces needed for a blockade.

Joint blockade operations would rely most heavily on six main types of PLA forces: naval surface and submarine fleets; air forces (including the PLA Air Force, Naval Aviation, and Army Aviation); conventional rocket forces; coastal and air defense forces; and support forces.

PLA writings emphasize that seizing the “three dominances” (三权) in key domains—information, maritime, and air—is crucial to executing a joint blockade campaign. China’s varying forces each play a role in this.

Missile strikes could, therefore, play a pivotal role. PLA writings stress the importance of degrading key enemy capabilities like air and coastal defense batteries before widely deploying China’s forces close to Taiwan to enforce a blockade. China may also target key civilian targets to limit Taipei’s ability to govern and respond.

China could instead launch a less kinetic blockade to try to reduce international backlash—as outlined in the second and third scenarios below. However, this would risk exposing China’s blockading forces to counterattacks and not putting enough pressure on Taiwan to achieve Beijing’s desired goals.

The PLA would not be operating alone in executing a blockade.

Chinese maritime law enforcement forces would play a key role. The China Coast Guard (CCG) is the largest coast guard in the world by number of oceangoing vessels. Once the PLA has established the “three dominances,” the CCG—with help from China’s civilian maritime law enforcement agency, the Maritime Safety Administration (MSA)—would help maintain and enforce the blockade by interdicting noncompliant ships. This is critical to allowing China to portray the blockade as a domestic law enforcement matter.

Rounding out China’s blockading forces would be the maritime militia—a network of organized, trained, and armed personnel operating in fishing vessels and other civilian craft.

These militia would not engage in force-on-force operations, but they could fill gaps in China’s ISR and complicate Taiwan’s maritime domain awareness by swarming in certain areas. The militia could also potentially aid in logistics by ferrying limited amounts of equipment and personnel to PLA vessels supporting the blockade operations.

China could also receive support from partners like Russia. As China and Russia have grown closer in recent years, their militaries have conducted joint naval and aerial exercises in the Western Pacific and elsewhere. Russia may not intervene directly, but Beijing could request that Moscow take action to show support for China.

Scenario 1

All-Out Kinetic Blockade

This scenario aligns most closely with PLA doctrinal writings and is believed by many U.S. analysts to be the most likely approach China might take if its goal is to use a blockade to force Taiwan to capitulate, negotiate on unification, or set the conditions for successful invasion.

It is predicated on the PLA establishing the “three dominances” (in the information, air, and maritime domains) to set the conditions for effectively imposing and sustaining a blockade.

A week after offensive operations begin, Beijing pauses kinetic strikes to offer an opportunity for negotiations and time for noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO). China offers to establish humanitarian corridors for Taiwan citizens to seek refuge on the mainland and says Chinese civilian airplanes and vessels would take part in the evacuation. These actions are aimed at weakening Taiwan’s internal cohesion and willingness to fight.

If Taiwan continues to resist after this initial pause, China periodically engages in more missile strikes to stop Taiwan’s military from reconstituting damaged equipment and deploying additional mobile weapons systems.

Beijing is prepared to enforce the blockade for months but builds in subsequent pauses if Taiwan is willing to negotiate. Implementing a protracted blockade will require the PLA to periodically rotate personnel and equipment—a tall order for a military that last engaged in a war more than four decades ago.

On top of military operations, China engages in massive efforts to stir up pro-Beijing and other elements within Taiwan to advocate for negotiating with Beijing. This includes spreading false rumors, sabotaging counter-blockade efforts, and inciting unrest and public demonstrations against Taiwan’s government. Beijing could further elevate the status of a particular opposition leader or proxy in Taiwan and offer to negotiate with them instead of Taipei. 

Scenario 2

Mining Blockade

While the first blockade scenario is representative of the likeliest approach China may take, it is not the only plausible option. China can vary the level of forces it deploys and adjust its rules of engagement to manage escalation. This second scenario is a scaled-down version of the all-out kinetic blockade.

Like the first scenario, China begins by announcing major live-fire exercises to take place in five air and maritime exclusion zones off Taiwan’s major ports. As part of the exercises, China’s rocket forces fire over a dozen ballistic missiles over and around Taiwan, but they splash down in the water rather than hitting targets in Taiwan. This is intended to intimidate Taiwan and international shipping companies and deter other countries from intervening.

During the exercises, PLA submarines covertly lay sea mines at the entrances of Taiwan’s major ports. The mines are timed to activate later to coincide with the start of blockade operations.

After five days of exercises, the PLA announces the start of “special law enforcement operations” and releases the coordinates for an air and maritime exclusion zone around Taiwan. Whereas in scenario one the zone covered the entire Taiwan Strait, in this scaled-back scenario, the zone only covers the eastern half of the strait.

Crucially, the PLA does not conduct joint firepower strikes against targets in Taiwan. However, PLA cyber forces conduct non-kinetic attacks to disrupt military and civilian communication systems and internet access and to disable energy and transportation infrastructure.

To enforce the blockade, the PLA Navy positions seven SAGs around Taiwan, and Beijing announces that mines have been laid near the entrances of key ports. China also deploys approximately 20 law enforcement vessels around Taiwan throughout the maritime exclusion zone.

Dozens of maritime militia vessels are also positioned alongside law enforcement ships to provide ISR and swarm vessels attempting to enter the exclusion zone.

Commercial ships are to be engaged by law enforcement and maritime militia vessels unless only PLA Navy ships are in range, and they are to first try nonlethal measures such as ramming and spraying water cannons. Taiwan navy vessels are to be engaged by PLA forces.

To enforce the no-fly zone, the PLA regularly flies aircraft around Taiwan. Since Taiwan’s air defense capabilities are still intact, the PLA relies more heavily on unmanned systems.

All Chinese forces are ordered to not strike first, but they are authorized to return fire if they are attacked.

This approach has advantages and disadvantages compared to the all-out kinetic scenario. By not cutting off the entire strait, Beijing would aim to allow commercial traffic to continue transiting, which may reduce the economic fallout for China.

China would also seek to avoid U.S. intervention since a partial blockage of the Taiwan Strait does not significantly impact international trade and is less likely to be seen by the United States and many other countries as violating international customary laws on freedom of navigation and overflight.

By not launching joint firepower strikes against targets in Taiwan and by maintaining more strict rules of engagement, Beijing may hope to avoid rapid escalation of the conflict and reduce the willingness of the United States and other countries to intervene. However, failing to degrade Taiwan’s defensive capabilities and the island’s energy infrastructure will leave China’s air and maritime forces exposed to counterattacks and leave Taiwan with a greater ability to withstand Chinese pressure for longer.

If Taiwan escalates significantly, Beijing could intensify its own approach and evolve operations to resemble the all-out kinetic blockade.

Scenario 3

Limited Blockade

This final blockade scenario is largely consistent with the second scenario but lacks mining. It is the least kinetic and escalatory of the three scenarios.

Similar to the second scenario, China stages large-scale drills around Taiwan, including live firing of ballistic missiles that splash down in the waters near Taiwan. Beijing then announces the start of “special law enforcement operations” and publishes the coordinates for a maritime and air exclusion zone that covers the main island of Taiwan but does not cut off the entire Taiwan Strait.

China deploys air, maritime, cyber, and other forces in much the same way as in scenario two, and they operate under the same rules of engagement.

The key difference from scenario two is the lack of mining. Mines serve to deter vessels from attempting to run the blockade, and they offer a more passive means for the PLA to threaten noncompliant ships. Without mines, China’s forces will need to play a more active role in stopping entry into Taiwan and may therefore be put in more situations in which commanders have to make decisions about exactly how to engage.

This approach could have potential upsides. This limited blockade is easier to implement since covert minelaying can be difficult—especially in the shallow waters of the Taiwan Strait. This limited blockade is also more reversible. Mines typically cannot be easily removed or deactivated, meaning that once the mines are laid China is committed to its approach.

By avoiding the use of mines and kinetic attacks against Taiwan, Beijing would seek to control potential escalation spirals between the PLA and Taiwan’s forces. More broadly, by taking this approach, Beijing would seek to demonstrate restraint to the international community, which could lend China’s actions greater credibility among countries seeking to remain neutral.

This scenario is the least likely of the three. The lack of kinetic operations and mining leaves the PLA highly exposed to escalation by Taiwan or interventions by the United States.

Conclusion

The three scenarios are intended only to offer three illustrative ways China could blockade Taiwan. Of these three scenarios, the all-out kinetic blockade is the more plausible one and most in line with Chinese military doctrine. 

It is also possible that China could pair a blockade with other kinetic military operations. For example, Beijing could combine a blockade of the main island of Taiwan with a seizure of one or more outlying islands administrated by Taiwan, such as Kinmen or Matsu near China, the Penghus near Taiwan, or Pratas in the South China Sea.

A blockade would cut off Taiwan’s ability to reinforce and defend these islands, and seizing an island could provide Beijing a “win” even if the blockade does not lead to Taipei’s capitulation.

The success or failure of a Chinese blockade depends on many factors. Taiwan’s resilience and willingness to defend itself and the extent to which Washington and its allies intervene are critical. How well prepared the PLA is and how Beijing controls its frontline forces and manages escalation are important not only to a successful blockade but also to ensure that a blockade does not unintentionally escalate into an invasion or war.

Given its current military capabilities, some in Beijing may assess that a blockade carries a higher chance of operational success than an invasion in the near term. Yet Chinese decisionmakers likely recognize that a blockade would be an immensely risky choice with no guarantee of success.

This is part two of a series. To see part 1, click here.

This report was made possible by general support to CSIS. No direct sponsorship contributed to this report.