Insights for Future Conflicts from the
Russia-Ukraine War

[ INSIGHT 1 ]

Combat Nuclear Threats Incrementally

By Colonel Nathan Lewis, U.S. Air Force

Russia’s nuclear threats impacted both the speed and scale of Western military support to Ukraine.

Following the invasion in February 2022, Putin readied strategic Russian nuclear forces and threatened the use of nuclear weapons to defend its territory (including Ukrainian territory captured during the invasion). Within this context, Western nations methodically provided Ukraine with more advanced and long-range systems, one system at a time. For example, British Storm Shadow missiles were not employed until May 2023, while U.S. Army Tactical Missile Systems were not provided until October 2023. U.S.-made F-16 aircraft were supplied to Ukraine in August 2024. By some accounts, nuclear war was only avoided by stern warnings from the U.S. national security advisor and a message from President Biden.

The Russia-Ukraine War provides a successful model of how incremental military aid can keep warfare at the conventional, nonnuclear level. Incremental escalation—providing support and then pausing to gauge the Russian reaction before providing more advanced support—contributed to the absence of a nuclear detonation in this conflict.

Russian forces matched Ukraine’s ingenuity on the battlefield. Their ability to adapt to new Ukrainian technology or tactics has improved remarkably since the war began and can now be measured in mere weeks. One example was their introduction of fiber-optic controlled drones, which circumvented Ukraine’s radio jamming advances while still matching their predecessors’ range and speed. As with most advancements in the war, this innovation was quickly adopted and subsequently improved by Ukraine. 

Despite rapid advances, the use of unmanned sea and aerial drones today is still an evolution, not a revolution, of warfare. Judged through the lens of defense offset strategy, a revolutionary advance would gain and maintain a significant advantage over adversaries over long periods of time. While innovative, the technological advancements gained through iteration provided battlefield advantage measured in days or even hours before the opponent adapted, thus making it evolutionary. 

Future warfare will feature innovations that adapt as technologies evolve. Encrypted AI software in drones allowed Ukraine to maintain a technological advantage, as a simple firmware upgrade could provide enhanced capabilities without the need for new hardware. Gaining advantages without updating hardware speeds the cycles of innovation  

For future warfare, tanks provide what future tech needs most: power. The Russian “Turtle Tanks” demonstrate how future tanks could offer a mobile and survivable platform that supplies power for electronic attack, electronic protection, and drones. The tanks of the next war might contribute to success as a mobile protected supporter that is difficult to stop.

To maintain a technological and logistical edge, Ukraine has disaggregated drone maintenance and refitting into agile workshops dispersed across the frontline and embedded unmanned system engineers and technicians there. This has enabled rapid acquisition based on feedback and requirements directly from warfighters.

The very short design, construction, combat testing, and hardware/software revision cycles of dynamic acquisition create a competitive edge. Authorizing these decisions at lower levels and with less oversight incurs accountability and program sustainment risks but is necessary to innovate at the speed of war.

Traditional nodal concentration—large supply centers and transportation hubs—has proved vulnerable to long-range precision strikes. Ukraine’s cyber defense efforts, however, including a volunteer “Cyber Army,” have safeguarded logistics networks, while the rapid expansion of Ukraine’s “Army of Drones” has highlighted the potential of integrating commercial, military, and civilian innovation in wartime logistics.

Future success in contested environments will depend not only on moving supplies but on mastering data, defending networks, and leveraging innovation across all domains. Future military logistics must also adopt a strategy of disaggregation—distributing assets to avoid targeting while maintaining the capability to rapidly reaggregate at the point of need.

State, society, industry, and military units can now be connected directly and at speeds and scales previously unimaginable. Ukraine has created data tools to share tactical data from citizens and military units that bypass traditional government hierarchies. These tools visualize logistics, kinetic fires, emergency response, and even the scope of war crimes.

Companies have used radar imagery and data from commercial satellites to help Ukrainian civilians find evacuation routes and map power grid damage for restoration without dangerous surveys. The Ukrainian application Diia’s digital identification and passport system has helped displaced Ukrainians cross borders when physical documents are inaccessible. The Ukrainian tech industry recognizes it possesses several key niche capabilities for future warfare and foresees export opportunities in the future.

The Russia-Ukraine War previews the future role of AI and data integration in warfare. Militaries gain advantages by creating a common platform for intelligence, operations, logistics, and planning functions; developing user-friendly systems to minimize training load; and granting authority to frontline forces to rapidly evolve tactics.

The new elements of space warfare also have led to cross-domain implications. Russia has struggled to integrate space operations effectively and has been unable to deny Ukraine’s satellite communications. The failure to achieve spectrum superiority also has hindered Russia’s network-centric warfare capabilities and underscored the importance of resilient communications and electronic warfare.

Meanwhile, the collaboration between Russia and China in space operations, including sharing commercial imagery, signals a growing challenge to U.S. space security. Over the last 30 years, U.S. space domain superiority has allowed the United States to reduce its army, navy, and air force significantly. If neither side can secure the space domain in future wars, we can anticipate attritional trench line warfare like the Russia-Ukraine War.

Russian soldiers’ will to fight has suffered repeated blows throughout the war, rooted in the failure to secure what seemed like a quick, guaranteed victory. Despite generous recruiting incentives to families in Russia’s struggling economy, Russia has needed to secure prisoner labor and North Korean soldiers to bolster its meatgrinder assaults. In 2024, desertion and drug use in the Russian military reached unprecedented levels.

All things being equal, the side with a stronger will to fight will persevere and succeed. But all things are not equal in warfare. Ukraine’s will to fight has compensated for shortfalls but might not last forever.

Ukraine has embraced innovative changes to body armor and uniforms to optimize protection, functionality, and dignity for women serving in the conflict.

Beyond serving as soldiers, Ukrainian women have contributed as humanitarian actors, community leaders, and providers for their families. Their effort contributes to a whole-of-society resilience that creates a deterrent effect.

Women in the armed forces and beyond enhance defense capability. For future warfare, nations that demonstrate a unified will to resist present a stronger deterrent against aggressors.

In future warfare, the commonly understood story, supported by facts and events on the ground, will impact the amount of tangible support (or constraints) a side will receive from the international community. The way the United States is regarded by its allies and partners will influence the level of international commitment to future campaigns and impact the chances of success.

CONCLUSION

Insights from the Russia-Ukraine War are crucial lessons, but each war’s character differs based on the participants, along with their technology and political objectives.

Future conflicts will continue to be a contest of wills and skilled campaigners who use all tools at their disposal to achieve a relative and lasting advantage. Some of these insights can contribute to that advantage.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the U.S. government or Department of Defense.